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m THE SUPRE~IIE COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JULIA T. ALVAREZ, ) 
} 
Plaintiff and Appell~~t ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) Case No .. 
PAUL PAULUS and STOVER: ) 
BEDDING and MANUFACTURING ) 8895 
COMPANY, a corpora tion 1 ) ) 
Defendants and Respondents. ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a verdict made 
and entered in the Court of the Hon. Fo w. 
Keller o,f the Third Judiotal District in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the 
12th day of April 1 1958 and made final by 
the order of said Court overruling the motioru 
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tor new trial in said case on the 1st day 
of May, 1958., 
The complaint alleges as follows: 
"Plaintiff complains of defendants 
and for cause of action alleges: 
1. That Maria Elena Ontiveros, a 
minor, who was killed by the defend-
ants as hereinafter alleged on the 
15th day of January, 19581 was the 
minor child of the plaintiff and was 
a deserted child by the father there-
of. 
2. That the defendant Paul Paulus 
is a resident of Salt Lake Ci ty1~ 
State of Utah, and the defendant 
Stover Bedding and Manufacturing 
Company, is a corporation organi-
zed and existing under and by virtue 
of the laws of the State of ~tah, 
having its principal place of busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. That on the 15th day of January,., 
1958 at about the hour of 12:57 p.m.,, 
the said defendant Paul Paulus was 
operating a truck in the course of 
his employment and as the ag~t of 
the defendant Stover Bedding and 
Manufacturing Company, westerly upon1 
Emeril Avenue at a point just east 
of 216 Emeril Avenue, Salt Lake City,, 
Utah, and that the defendants so neg-
ligently and carelessly managed and 
operated said truck at said time and 
place that said truck violently ran 
against and over mortally injuring 
and killing Maria Elena Ontiveros, 
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the minor daughter of said plain-
tiff, and that by reason of the neg-
ligence, carelessness and violence 
of the defendants aforesaid and as 
a proximate result thereof the said 
Maria Elena Ontiveros was struck• 
run over, mortally injured and 
killed by said defendants at said 
time ·and place. 
4. That at the time of the killing 
and death of said Maria Elena Ontiveros, 
the minor daughter of plaintiff, 
she was of the age of 22 months; 
was unmarried and had no issue; was 
strang, healthy and robust and was 
a source of great comfort to the 
plaintiff. That by reason of the: 
death and killing of said Maria 
Elena Ontiveros aforesaid, plain-
tiff has been totally and forever 
deprived of the society, comfort, 
protection and services of her said 
minor daughter1 all to her damage in the sum of ~21,000.00. That 
plaintiff has been required to pay 
the sum of $290.00 for the funeral 
and burial expenses and incidents 
to the funeral and burial of said 
deceased daughter and that plaintiff 
has therefore been damaged in the 
sum of $290.00 special damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment 
against the defendants for the sum 
of $21 1 000.00 general damages· and $290.00 special damages and alli 
costs incurred herein." 
W. D. BEATIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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The answer of the defendants is as 
follows: 
l"Come now the defendants and by 
way of answer to the plaintiff's 
complaint heretofore filed ·in the 
above-entitled action, admit, deny, 
and a~lege as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Complaint fails to state a 
claim against the defendants upon 
which relief can be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
The defendants admit the allega-
tions of paragraph 2 of plaintiff's 
complaint; admit that on the 15th 
day of January, 19581 at approxi-
mately 12:57 P. M. Maria Elena 
Ontiveros, met her death in a pedes-
trial-vehicle accident on Emeril Ave-
nue, at a point East of 216 Emeril 
Avenue in Salt Lake City, Utah; 
that the vehicle involved in said 
accident was a truck owned by the 
Stover Bedding and Manufacturing 
Company and driven by Paul Paulus, 
an employee of the defendant,Stover 
Bedding and Manufacturing Company.-
The defendants specifically deny 
that they were careless, negligent, 
or violent in the operation of the 
said vehicle, and the defendants 
deny each and every other allega-
tion contained in plaintiff's com-
plaint not heretofore admdtted. 
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THIRD DEFENSE 
The defendants affirmatively allege 
that the plaintiff was negligent 
on the 15th day of January, 19581, 
at the time of said aociden t which 
was the approximate hour of 12:57 
P. M., in that she failed to use 
that measure of prudence required 
by the circumstances in the pro-
·tection and care of her minor child, 
Maria Elena Ontiveros, in that she 
allowed her child of the tender 
years of 22 months to be unattended 
on Emeril Avenue, in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, and plaintiff knowing full 
well that Emeril Avenue was a thor-
oughfare frequented by vehicles of 
all descriptions, including the de-
fendant's truok., That such negli-
gence on the part of the plaintiff 
was the sole and proximate oausa 
of the injury and death of Maria 
Elena Ontiveros. 
WHEREFORE, defendants pray that 
plaintiff's complaint be dismissed 
and that they have their costs in-
curred herein." 
Dated this 17th day of February,, 
1958., 
EMMETT L •. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendants 
The pretrial order of Han. A· H. Ellett 
was as follows:: 
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!'The above -entitled rna tter came 
regularly before the court for 
pretrial on March 26 1 1958. The 
parties appeared by counsel as 
follows: 
For the plaintiff, w. D. Beatie. 
For the defendants, Emmett Brown. 
The following matters are not in 
dispute, and no proof will be re-
quired to establish them at the 
trial of this lawsuit: 
1. Plaintiff is the mother of Maria 
Elena Ontiveros, a minor child of the 
age of twenty-two months at the time 
she diedo 
2. On the 15th day of January, 19581 
Maria Elena Ontiveros lost her life 
as a result of being run over by a 
truck driven by Paul Paulus 1 who was 
the agent of the Stover Bedding and 
Manufacturing Company and in the 
course of his employment at the time. 
3. The reasonable cost of funeral 
expenses necessarily incurred in the 
burying of Maria Elena Ontiveros 
was $188.05. 
4. Maria Elena Ontiveros was run 
over a few minutes before one o'clock 
in the afternoon of January 15 1 19581 
and the roads were wet but not icy. 
It is the contention of plaintiff 
- fl -
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that her child was an illegiti-
rruite child and that she lost her 
life by reason of the following 
acts of negligence on the part of 
Paul Paulus: 
(a} He backed his truck without 
keeping a proper lookout for pedes-
trians along the highway and par--
ticularly for Maria Elena Ontiveros. 
(b) He backed his truck onto Maria 
Elena Ontiveros without giving any 
warning or signal that he was back-
ing the truck. 
(c) He failed to yield to Maria 
Elena Ontiveros the right of way 
to which she was entitled. 
Plaintiff further contends that as 
a result of the negligence of Paul 
Paulus, she is entitled to recover 
from the defendants and each of them 
the funeral expenses incurred in the 
burial of her child to~ether with 
damages in the sum of @21 1 000.00. 
It is the contention of the defend-
ants and each of them that Paul Paulus 
was not negligent as claimed by the 
plaintiff or at all and that the 
death of the child was the result 
of an accident. Defendants further 
contend that the plaintiff was her-
self negligent in that she allowed 
a twenty-two month old child to be 
playing in the street without proper 
supervision. The defendants further 
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con tend that the plaintiff cannot 
maintain this action for the reason 
that she is not the proper person 
to bring the same. 
The court being advised in the mat-
ters now finds that there exist the 
following: 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT 
1. Was Paul Paulus negligent as 
claimed by the plaintiff? 
2o Was the plaintiff negligent as 
claimed by the defendants? 
3. Was such negligence, if any, a 
proximate cause of the injuries re-
ceived by Maria Elena Ontiveros? 
4. What is the amount of general 
damages sustained by Julia T. Alvarez? 
5. Was Maria Elena Ontiveros ille-
gitimate? 
DISPUTED ISSUES OF LAW 
1. Is the plaintiff entitled to 
bring this action? 
2. Is the plaintiff entitled to recover· 
from the defendants? 
It is ordered that all pleadings here-
tofore filed in this action be merged 
in this pretrial order, and the only 
issues of law or of fact to be heard 
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and determined upon the trial here-
of are those set forth herein~ ex-
cept that for good cause shown and· 
to prevent manifest injustice this 
order may be subsequently amendedo 
It is further ordered that this case 
be set do~wn for jury trial commenc--
ing Friday, April 11, !.958, at ten 
o'clock a. m. " 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
26th day of March, 1958~ 
A. H. ELLErT 
Judge 
FACTS 
Emeril Avenue where this accident hap-
pened is a private right-of-way which runs~ 
west from First West Street just north of 
the Claudann Apartments which is located at 
25 North lst West Street. This right-of-way 
is 20 feet wide and 330 feet long and runs 
easterly and westerly. 
The defendant Stover Bedding and Manu-
facturing Company has a warehouse built in 
a "U" shape around the west end of Emeri 1 
Avenue and the north side of the warehouse 
is partially adjacent to the right-of-way~ 
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The entrances to the Stover warehouse 
are on the north and south side of the 
Emeril Avenue portion of the warehouse. 
and not adjacent to the right-of-way. 
Reference hereafter to record desig-
nated (R} and to Exhibits (Ex.). 
Plaintiff called as a witness the 
defendant Paul Paulus who testified that 
he was the driver of the 2i ton Reo truck 
in the course of his employment for the 
defendant Stover Bedding and Manufacturing 
Company and that he approached Emeril Ave-
nue on the day in question from the north 
and made a right-hand turn into Emeril Ave-
nue and proceeded westerly about 3/4 of the 
way down the Avenue and turned his truck 
into a driveway on the north side designated 
as being that area between the houses desig-
nated as 226 and 228 Emeril Avenue (Exo 14) 
and stopped at point. ( P-1, Ex. 19) (R-49) o 
That it was his intention to back the truck to 
thA Stover warehouse for loadin~ but that he 
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could not make the turnaround in the small 
driveway in order to back the truck up 
because of two automobiles parked in the 
south side of Emeril Avenue. {Ex. P-11). 
He then drove the truck backwards out of 
Emeril Avenue in an easterly direction to 
point {P-2), R-50) then to point {P•3l' 
(R-51) and (P-4) (R-52) all shown on 
(Ex. P-19) 1 where the truck was brought to 
a stop then facing in an easterly direction. 
He got out of his truck and walked around it, 
warned three older children away from the 
truck who were standing on the south side 
of Emeril Avenue near the Claudann Apart-
ments. {R-63). He then got in his truck 
and honked his horn and proceeded to back 
his truck westerly along Emeril Avenue 
and claimed at all times to have been 
watching to the rear of the truck from 
the rear-view mirrors on the right and 
- 11 -
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left sides of the cab of the truck. De-
fendant Paulus never observed the twenty-
two month old deceased until he had run 
over her and she was lying in front of the 
truck and he then brought his truck to a 
stop at the point in Emeril Avenue as shovvn 
by (Ex. P-4) and .Ex •. P-5). The point where 
the body of the child was lying is shown 
as Point A (Ex. 5)o 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON. BY 
APPELLANT FOR REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR: 
POINT l 
IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE THEORY OF 
APPELLANT OF FAILURE TO YIELD RIGHT-
OF-lNAY AS NIDLIGENCE WHEN PRETRIAL 
ORDER SET FORTH THIS MATTER AS ISSUE 
AND TEE GIVlliG OF INSTRUCTION NOo 7 
DIRECTING THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTIONl 
OF RIGHT...OF..WAYo 
POINT 2 
IN SUBMITTING QUESTION OF ACCIDENT 
AS A DEFENSE TO THE JURY. 
POINT 3 
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION: OF 
... 12 ... 
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CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF APPELL-
ANT TO THE JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POlllT 1 
IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT THE THEORY OF 
APPELLANT OF FAILURE TO YIELD RIGffil-
OF-WAY AS NIDLIGENCE WHEN PREI'RIAL 
ORDER SEr FORTH THIS MATTER AS ISSUE, 
AND THE GIVING OF INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
DI_RECTING THAT THERE WAS NO QUESTION! 
OF RIGffi'-QF•WAY. 
The law is well established that each 
party is entitled to have its full theory 
presented to the jury by instructions. 
Martineau v. Hansen, 47 Utah 5491 155 P. 
432; Toone v. J. Po O'Neil Const. Co., 
40 Utah 265 1 121 Po 10; Pratt v. Utah Light 
& Traction Co.~ 57 Utah 7~ 169 Po 868; 
Morgan v. Bingham Stage Lines Co., 75 Utah 
871 283 P. 160; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 
151, 140 P. (2d) 772; McDonald v. Union Paci-
fic R. Coo 109 U • 4931 167 P •. ( 2d) 6~85; Startin 
Vo Madsen 120 u. 631, 237 Po (2d) 834. 
In Pratt v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 
supra, the Court statedt 
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"'Each party to a suit is entitled 
to have his theory, when there is 
evidence to sustain it, submitted 
to the jury and the judgment of the 
jury on the facts tending to support 
such theory, ass~ng always that 
there is testimony offered to sup-
port the same, and this Court has 
so held in Hartley v. Salt Lake City~ 
41 Utah 121~ 124 Pac. 522 1 where, 
speaking through Straup,J.,it is said: 
11
'There are two parties to a law suit. 
Each,. on, a submission of the case to 
the jury, is en titled to a submission-
of it on his theory and the law.' in res-
pect thereof. The defendant's theory as. 
to the cause of the accident is embodied: 
in the proposed requests. There i& some 
evidence as we have shown, to render 
them applicable to the case. That is 
not disputed. We think the court's re-
fusal to charge substantially as request-
ed was error. That the ruling was pre-
judicial and works a reversal of the judg-
ment is self-evident and unavoidable.'"' 
In Beckstrom va. Williams, 282 Pac. (2d) 
3091 J. Crockett stated at page 310: 
"The jury having rejected plaintiff'$ 
complaint, on appeal,) we would ordin-
arily view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the defendant. This 
is not true, however, in this case 
where the plain tiff 's appeal challenges~ 
the trial court's refusal to submit 
plaintiff's theory of the case to tha 
jury~ as was his undoubted right if the 
evidence would justify reasonable men 
in following his theory."' 
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Under the testimony of the defendant 
Paul Paulus, he first proceeded into Emeril 
Avenue to point P-1 (Ex. 19) J, then backed 
his truck easterly toward First West to 
Point 21 (Ex. 19);. then through several 
manipulations turned the truck around to 
Point 3 (Ex. 19), and finally came to rest 
at Point 4, (Ex. 19) at which point he got 
out of the truck and walked around the same 
before proceeding to back the truck in a 
westerly direction into Emeril Avenue. It 
is to be noted that Point 41 above referred 
to is completely off the right-of-way of 
what is called Emeril Avenue, and that the 
ultimate destination of the truck was past 
the west end and off the right-of-way of 
Emeril Avenue and that the defendant Paulus: 
was therefore a trespasser on the right-of-
way at the time of the accident. The de-
ceased child had a perfect right as a pedes-
trian to use the right-of-way and in walking 
- 15 -
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in an easterly direction she traveled a 
greater distance from the west end of 
the porch of 218 Emeril Avenue than the 
truck tr~eled from Point 4 to the point 
of the accident. His failure to yield the 
right-of-way to the deceased could have 
been found by the jury to constitute neg-
ligence and this negligence, the proximate, 
oause of the death of the deceased. This 
finding could have been made independently 
of any statute and if such were the faot, 
liability of necessity would have been 
established against the defendants in this 
caseo Depriving the plaintiff of this sub-
stantial ground of recovery and a refusal 
to instruct the jury as requested by plain-
tiff's instruction No. 7 1 and the giving of 
Instruction No. 7,, which ins truction express-
ly stated that there was no preference in 
the use of the right-of-way as between the 
pedestrian and the truck, resulted in thia. 
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oase in an injustice and the denial to 
the plaintiff to that fair trial to which 
she was entitled under the laws of this 
State. 
POINT 2 
IN SUBMITTlllG QUESTION OF ACCIDENT 
AS A DEFENSE TO THE JURY. 
The pre-trial order of Judge Ellett 
stated: 
wrt is the contention of the de-
fendants and each of them that 
Paul Paulus was not negligent as 
claimed by the plaintiff or at al~ 
and that the death of the child was 
the result of an accident." (R.lO) 
The defendants submitted an instruction 
on accident (R.l71) and the court in-
structed the jury in instruction No. 6 1 
the latter part of which is as follows:. 
"The law recognizes that there are 
occasions when the operators of 
motor vehicles strike and inflict 
serious bodily injury or aeath 
upon pedestrians under circumstances 
where the driver of such vehicle or 
the pedestrian or person responsible 
for the safety of the pedestrian use 
due care. In such cases 1 there is~ 
no liability in law upon the of the 
persons involved." (R.l82) 
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It is the contention of appellant that the 
wording of this latter part of the instruc-
tion is in effect the wording of an instruc-
tion on what is called accident or unavoidable 
accident, when the issue, as the jury waa 
instructed was first, the negligence of the 
defendants, and secondly~ the contributory 
negligence of the plaintiff. 
In Hogan vs. Kansas City Pub. Serv. 
Co. 19 SW (2d) 707 1 65 ALR 129. The Court 
at page 137 of ALR said: 
8 It will be noticed that the respondent 
assumes an accident instruction is pro-
per if the evidence permits an infer-
ence that the parties {participants or· 
litigants) were innocent of negligenceo 
This is not the law, unless there is 
something in the record tending to 
show the casualty resulted from an 
unknown cause. It is not every true 
accident case in which the court may 
instruct on. accident. When, as here, 
the misadventure resulted from known 
actions of known persons and things 
the giving of an accident ins true ti on· 
is error by the great weight of recent 
authority in this State. * * *· The 
word accident in popular acceptation· 
and sometimes in law may denote an 
occurence arising without intent or 
design, or even from the carelessness· 
of man; but in the law of negligence 
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it simplifies an event resulting irr 
damage or injury proceeding from 
an unknown cause or from a known cause 
without human agency or without human 
fault.. 1 C.J •. pp 390 et seq;. 20 R.C.L. 
pp 171 et seqo The essential require-
ment is that the happening be one to 
which human fault does not contributeo 
At page 138 and in Wise vs. St. Louis 
Transit, supra,: 
'There was no evidence in the case' 
of any accident or misadventure. The 
issue tendered by the pleadings and: 
by the evidence was simply whether 
the defendant was negligent or not and 
the Court was right in not inviting 
the jury into a field of conjecture and 
speculation. r " 
In the case of Cheshire v. Nall, 219 s. w. 
(2d) 248. 
c. J. Pitts at 254 said: 
"The trial court prepared the charges, 
after all the evidence had been heard: 
and it was not required to submit 
any issues other than those raised, 
by the pleadings and the evidence~ 
The issue of unavoidable accident 
exists in such a case and should be 
submitted only where there is evidence 
that something other than the negli-
gence of at least one of the drivers 
caused the injuries complained ofo In 
this case the evidence showed conclu-
sively that the collision occurred on 
a level paved highway at a slight curve: 
with a small incline but nothing to ob-
struct the view of the driverso There 
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was no evidence of any slippery 
highway or obstruction on the high-
way or any break in the mechanism 
of either automobile immediately 
before the collision or any otheF 
intervening cause of the collision. 
In our opinion the evidence raised 
no issue of unavoidable accident." 
In Western Union Telegraph co. v. Henson, 
222 s. w. (2d) 636. 
c. J. Pitts at 640 said: 
"Appellant attacks the trial court's 
judgment in its 2nd point of error be-
cause it refused to submit to the jury 
the issue of unavoidable accident •· The 
rule has been well established that 
such an issue exists only when there is 
evidence that something other than the 
negligence of one of the parties caused 
the injury about which complaint is 
made.'t 
In Texas Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Wemberly,_. 
108 s. w. (2d} 860. 
c. J. Leslie at page 863 said: 
•rn the case of Magnolia Coca Cola co. 
v. Jordan, supra, it is said: 'The 
issue of unavoidable accident is not 
raised when there is no evidence ·tend-· 
ing to prove that the injuries resulted. 
from some cause other than the negli-
gence of one of the parties.• Boyle v. 
McClure, 24 s. w. 1080. 'There is no 
evidence from which it can be reasonably 
inferred that the injury of Mrs. Jordan 
was caused by any other than her own 
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negligence in driving her automo-
bile into a parked automobile or 
the negligence of the driver in 
plaintiff's in errors truck striking 
Mrs. Jordan 1 s automobile.. If the 
jury had answered that the in jury 
was the result of an unavoidable acci-
dent its findings would have been sup-
ported by nothing stronger than sur-
mise or suspiciono" 
In Flanagan v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,JJ 90 
N. E. 688. 
J. Vidcus at 689 said: 
"Appellant requested an instruction: 
that there was no liability for an 
unavoidable accident, and that if the_ 
jury believed, from the evidence, 
that, so far as appellant was con-
cerned the accident was unavoidable 
they should find the defendant not~ 
guilty. The court instructed the 
jury that the burden of proving neg-
ligence of the defendant was on the 
plaintiff; that this must govern the 
jury in deciding the case and that 
if by this rule the plain tiff hadl 
failed to establish his case it waa 
the duty of the jury to find the de-
fendant not guilty. An unavoidable 
accident is one necessarily occuring 
not because of negligence. The re-
quirement of proof of negligence there-
fore eliminates the hypothesis of un-
avoidable accident and it was not error' 
to refuse to give the instructiono" 
In Arva v. Karshner, 168 N. E. 237o 
Co J. Cushing at 238 said: 
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"The court further charged the jury 
as follows: 'At the suggestion of 
the attorneys for the defendants the 
court says to you that if you find 
from the evidence that the death of 
David Frank Arva was the result of an 
unavoidable accident that your verdict 
should be for defendant. r This por,... 
tion of the charge was erroneous as, 
the allegations of both the pe ti ti on and: 
answer charged negligence and an un-
avoidable accident is necessarily an 
accident oocuring not because of neg-
ligence and is one that happens with-
oat any apparent cause or without any 
fault attributable to anyone. If the: 
negligence of defendants was proveru 
to have proximately caused the acci-
dent and no contributory negligence 
was shown, plaintiff would be entitled 
to recover. If plaintiff failed to 
prove the negligence of defendants, 
proximately caused the injury, plain-
tiff could not recover. In such cases:, 
there is no place for the question of 
unavoidable aociden t .u 
It is respectfully contended that the 
issues in this case are the negligence of the 
defendant and the contributory negligence of 
the plaintiff as submitted to the jury, and, 
any issue of unavoidable accident is therefore 
eliminated and the giving of the latter por-
tion of this instruction No., 6 is prejudicial 
error. 
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Further, the latter portion of thia 
instruction is not the law wherein the oourt 
used in the latter part of said instruction: 
uwhere the driver of such vehicle 
or the pedestrian or person res.,,.. 
ponsible for the safety of the 
pedestrian use due oare't. 
The defendant Paul Paulus well knewv 
that there was the hazard of children dur-
ing the entire movement of his truck at this 
particular looa tion as shown by the follow ... 
ing testimony of said defendant Paulus: 
"~ All right, mark that P-1 will 
you? Paulus 1.. P-1. 
"Q Now will you ask Mr. Paulus please 
what next did you do with the truck 
and indicate the movement of the 
same from the point p ... 2 to some 
other point at whioh you brought 
the truck to a stop. 
'"A I left the truck. Looked around as; 
there were two cars standing there. 
And I took my truck. Children were 
playing here. I told the children 
to get away because I am ooming out~ 
Then I drove slowly this directiono 
(R • 49) 
"Q Now at the time you started to move 
the truck, Mr. Paulus, from point 
P-.4 you were interested principally 
in,. and only in the three children 
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when, which you say, at the south 
side of Emeril Avenue, were you not? 
11
'A I watched them constantly • (R •. 63) 
"Q I am going to ask you, Mr. Paulus, 
if there were not some children as; 
you were driving baek out of Emeri1 
Avenue on this day driving easterly,, 
there were not some children at about 
225 Emeril Avenue took hold of the 
rear of your truck and came up to 
the front at about 216 where the 
children there dropped off your 
truck •. Isn't that a fact? 
"A Children were hanging on the truck 
like this. tt 
This court has held in Woodward v. 
Spring Canyon Coal Co. 90 Utah, 5781 63 
Paco (2d) 2671 wherein c. J. Elias Hansen at 
page 587 said: 
"It is a matter of common knowledge 
that children are prone to be less; 
mindful of danger than are persons 
of rna ture years. For that reason, a 
greater degree of care is required of 
a person who drives an automobile in 
close proximity to children than is: 
required in driving in olose proximity 
to mature personso Herald v. Smith, 
Supra; Green v. Higbee, 66 Utah 539,, 
244 Pac. 906; Blashfield's Cyc. of 
Automobile Law and Practice {Perm.Ad.) 
Vol. 2, Seco 14921 page 519.tt 
It is therefore respectfully contended 
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~ 
that the court made no distinction in this 
instruction, between that degree of care 
necessary to drive i~ the neighborhood of 
mature persons and that greater degree of 
oare which is necessary where the driving 
. 
is in close proximity to chi]dren and the 
failure at: the court to: instruct the jury 
of that greater degree of care necessary for 
the defendant Paul Paulus to exercise in 
this particular instance is prejudicial 
error. 
POmT 3 
IN SUBMITTING THE QUESTION OF 
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF APPELL-
ANT TO THE JURY. 
The principal of law that the burden 
does not rest upon the plaintiff to show his 
freedon from negligence but upon defendant 
to prove contributory negligence unless the 
plaintiff's testimony tends to so prove it~ 
is well established by the oases~ Corbett 
v. Oregon Short Line Ry. Co. 25 Utah 449, 
71 Pao. 1065 •. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The defendants in this instance did not 
adduce any testimony other than by cross ex-
amination of plain tiff's witnesses, thus the 
testimony of contributory negligence would 
have to rely upon statements of plaintiff's 
witnesses. 
The only evidence of the use of Emeril 
Avenue right-of-way for vehicular traffic 
is that of the defendant Paul Paulus on di-
reot examination by plaintiff. 
"Q How many times prior to January 
1.5 1 1958 would you say that you 
had driven a truck for your em-
ployer Stover Bedding into Emeril 
Avenue and into your employerYs 
warehouse at the west end of 
Emeril Avenue? 
"A Way mf'ten .. 
0 Q Well ask him what he means by way 
ofteno 
nA He drove at least 4, 5 1 6 times a 
week .. 
"Q For a four-year period? 
"A No, for about a year since the 
fao tory was ereo tedo· 
"Q Will you ask him please if he would 
estimate that he has driven into 
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Emeril Avenue for his employer 
at least 100 times? 
"'A He thinks that is about right,, 
yes. "; (R •. 37) 
The plaintiff testified that on the 
day of this accident she was doing the family 
washing and that there were three of the 
children home on· that afternoon and that 
the three children were on the porch of 
plaintiff's residence for the first time 
that day when the accident happened; that 
while the children were on the porch she ob-
served the truck of the defendant going into 
Emeril Avenue and that she again saw the; 
truck (R •. ll9) going out towards First West 
at which time the children were on the porch 
and that she was standing in the doorway at 
the time; that she then went to the kitchen 
to see her washing and when she returned the 
accident had happened; that the children had1 
been on the porch that day not to exceed 
three minutes and tha. t there was about a 
minute and a half between the time she saw 
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all three children on the front porch and 
the time the accident happened. (R.,l20} 
The plain tiff testified on~ cross ex .. 
amination: 
"~· A little bit bigger than the dis~ 
tance between the houses. You 
have tha. t kind of back yard there. 
Now, Mrs. Alvarez, you said that 
the children -let's see, there 
was the little baby, 22 months old, 
and how old were the other two 
kiddies out on the porch? 
0 A Well,Freddie is six and Lupe is four. 
tr:Q Four and six. Pre-school child• 
ren, is that right? 
"A Tha. t 's right •· 
"Q I believe that you said that they, 
you always had them play just on 
the porch'? 
"A Yes. 
"Q Don't they ever go off this porch? 
"A When I go with them and take care 
of them .. 
"Q Just when you walk with them·? 
"A Yeso 
"Q Don 1 t they ever play in the back 
yard? 
n·A No. (R .. l29} 
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"Q How many times a day d1d you ~e~ 
them play on the porch? 
"A Two times a day. 
"Q About two times a day. Do you 
have any gateway that stops - did 
you have any gateway to stop Maria 
from getting off the porch? 
"A No I didn't have a gate. 
"Q. And for how long had you allowed 
them to go on the porch twice a 
day? 
"A At least two hours, because I -
"'Q And did they never go off the porch 
during those two hour periods 
twice a day'? 
"A No •. 
"Q Never did? 
"A No.. (R.l30) 
In the case of Riley v. Rapid Transit 
Co. 10 Utah 428, 37 Pac. 681. 
J. Smith said at page 437: 
nThe next assignment upon the in-
sufficiency of the evidence is that 
the plaintiff or his agents in charge 
of the child were negligent in allow-
ing the child upon the street. The 
record is entirely and absolutely 
silent upon the sub jeot of the care 
of those intrusted with this child • 
.. 29 .... 
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to show, how the child came into the 
street, and it seems to us that it 
would be going a long way to hold 
that it was negligence per se for 
the parents of a child seven years 
old to allow him to go upon the pub-
lic streets.. There is nothing to 
show that they knew anything of his 
being on the street. The defendant, 
in operating its street-car line, 
should operate it in such a way as: 
to protect the lives of children and 
other people, who have an equal right 
to the use of the street; and it is. 
guilty of culpable negligence if it 
fails to exercise ordinary care for-
the protection of such children, when 
they themselves, or those in charge 
of them, have done nothing to unnec-
essarily expose them to danger. 11 
In the case of Barker v. Savas, et al, 
52 Utah 262 1 172 Pac. 672 •. 
J. Thurman said at page 271: 
"We have already shown there was no 
evidence of contributory negligence 
on the part of the deceased, and that 
if such could be attributed to a child 
of his age and understanding, there 
being no evidence of his negligence, 
in view of his death by the accident, 
the law presumes that he exercised 
reasonable care for his ovm safety. 
This assignment of error is inexpli-
cable. Appellant assumes that deceased 
came to his death on the road from the 
blacksmith shop to his home; that plain-
tiff 1 having started him on that journey,. 
cannot recover for the injury that may 
have occurred because in sending a boy 
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of his age and discretion ou~ on ~ne 
public highway he was guilty of con-
tr·ibutory negligence. This theory 
and assumption of appellant do not 
reflect the facts as we read the 
record. The deceased left the black-
smith shop, after his father had re-
paired his tricycle, and must have 
gone straight home as his father di-
rected, for we find him there a few: 
minutes after. He then obtained 
permission of his mother to follow, 
the boys with the pony down to the: 
cemetery, as we have heret~ore shovm. 
She carefully watched him to that point, 
and saw him turn and start for home. 
Certainly there is not a scintilla of 
evidence in the record that any negli-
gence of the plaintiff contributed to 
the injury complained of. Neither was: 
there any negligence on the part of the 
mother. If the jury in this case ha& 
rendered a special verdict and found 
against the plaintiff on the grounds of 
contributory negligence of any of the 
parties concerned, and the question were 
presented to this court for review, we 
would feel it our duty to reverse the 
cause on that ground alone •" 
It is contended that the court committed 
prejudicial error in submitting the theory 
of contributory negligence of the plaintiff 
based upon the evidence adduced in this caseo 
The only evidence of vehicular traffic 
in the right-of-way is that of the defendant 
Jaul Paulus that he had been in Emeril Avenue 
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~t least 100 times and, over a period of 
one year, that would average about two 
times per week. The only testimony here 
is that the plaintiff on the day of the 
accident saw the truck drive into Emeril 
Avenue and back out of Emeril Avenue while 
the children were still on the porch and 
we submit that the only logical conclusion 
for plaintiff to have assumed was that the 
defendant's truck, when she saw the same 
back out of Emeril Avenue, had completero 
its mission. 
~ The plaintiff certainly could not be 
guilty of contributory negligence in fail-
ing to see any danger which she had no reas-
onable cause to apprehend or would be deceived 
by appearances calculated to deceive an or-
dinary prudent person after defendant's truck 
had made its exit past the residence of the 
plaintiff herein. 
It is submitted that under the Riley and 
Barker cases hereinbefore set forth, the 
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plaintiff, under the circumstances could 
not be guilty of contributory negligence 
and that the court commdtted prejudicial 
error in submitting the question of con-
tributory negligence of the plaintiff to 
the jury and denial of plaintiff's motion 
to dismiss the counterclaim of contributory 
negligence. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that 
the trial court erred in the matters herein, 
set forth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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